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ABSTRACT
In the art of photography, the phenomenon of vignetting means blurring of an image at its periphery 
compared to its centre. Vignettes are a form of road pricing independent of travel distance. Their usage 
in Croatia was recently rejected while in Europe, the number of countries using them, is increasing. 
The economic question of using vignettes as a primary source of revenue for the financing of Croatian 
highways was blurred by economically peripheral but politically sensitive welfare transfer issues. 
There has been no visible attempt to push the discussion back into the field of economics by using 
purely economic criteria such as: opportunity cost of usage, “sunk costs”, marginal costs, and total 
costs recovery. The paper aims at un-vignetting (un-blurring) the issue and re-focusing it towards 
economic arguments. The approach taken is a deductive-nomological argument based on opportunity 
costs of usage. The conclusion is straightforward: the vignettes are Pareto efficient since they make 
the society in general and the consumers in particular ultimately better off even after taking into 
account compensations. The opportunity costs of usage of congestion-free roads are zero. The optimal 
quantity-dependent price is then also zero. Since zero price does not recover costs, a differential 
pricing scheme needs to be put in place: one that does not depend on distance travelled. 
1 Introduction
In the art of photography, the phenomenon of vignet-
ting means blurring of an image at its periphery compared 
to its centre. The centre is in focus, whereas the periphery 
is not. In the science of transportation economics and pub-
lic finance, vignettes are a form of road pricing independ-
ent of travel distance. Vignettes are used for pricing car 
travel in Austria, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Italy, 
Moldova, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Switzerland, their 
introduction is under way in Germany, and their use was 
considered for Croatia, but recently rejected. Vignettes are 
a form of quantity independent pricing used to recover the 
“sunk costs” of road construction in the case of a supply of 
a typical “club good” where there are no positive opportu-
nity costs of road usage. 
Why does the question of vignettes need a substantial 
un-vignetting or un-blurring in Croatia? The question of 
vignettes is blurred by irrelevant political arguments and 
discussions that have entirely taken-over the decision-
making process, and the discussion has been entirely 
stripped of any economic arguments. Even as the ques-
tion of vignettes was revisited due to fiscal problems, the 
main economic argument in favour of vignettes was nei-
ther pointed out by the advocates nor was criticised by its 
opponents. 
The main economic argument in favour of vignettes is 
quite straightforward: the opportunity costs of highway 
usage by cars is zero until the point of congestion. 
Congestion itself may be created by suboptimal alloca-
tion (pricing) mechanisms. For example, the toll booths 
at exit points may create congestion problems. Contrary 
to cars, the opportunity cost of highway usage by lorries 
(trucks) is positive as significant road depletion costs as 
a function of road use imposes positive marginal costs of 
reconstruction (replacement). So, the pricing of roads and 
highways for the purposes of lorry transportation is out 
of the scope of this paper, and a separate European Union 
proposal for its pricing is already under examination by 
the member states. This paper focuses only on the eco-
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nomic theory behind various road pricing regimes for cars 
and their optimality. 
The question of vignettes in Croatia needs to be refo-
cused to an economic analysis, and especially an econom-
ic one based on static and dynamic social efficiency and 
Pareto optimality, on the commensurateness of underly-
ing mechanism designs with Pareto optimality, on the re-
coverability of infrastructure investment costs bearing in 
mind the opportunity costs of road usage; on economic 
consequences and adherence to the user pays normative 
principle, and finally, the necessary application of some 
compensation criterion during the transition phase and 
the resulting ethical issues. 
There are two aspects of efficiency: the microeconomic 
one, considering only the accounting expenses and reve-
nues of the highway system as a self sufficient enterprise 
and the macroeconomic one, taking into account the over-
all social effects of its spill-overs. The general economic 
criterion is given by the fulfilment of marginal conditions 
necessary for Pareto optimality. When opportunity costs 
of infrastructure usage are nil, the Pareto optimal price 
is also nil. But such a pricing scheme obviously does not 
recover initial investment costs that are sunk and if the 
highway were a private enterprise, such a pricing scheme 
would quickly push the enterprise into bankruptcy. Any 
private provision of highways would then need a pricing 
scheme with revenue (profit) maximisation as an objec-
tive function. The private sector has successfully managed 
to develop similar pricing schemes in telecommunications 
and broadcasting where the price is not related to the 
quantity but to the usage time instead. Why is the govern-
mental sector unable to develop its own organisational 
mechanism designs that would allocate the good efficient-
ly and serve the public interest at its best? One of the pos-
sible answers is certainly political: political elites serve 
their own political interests and are prone to log-rolling 
and pork-barrel policies.
Nevertheless, such an argument is deficient as the con-
clusion does not follow from the premises. Economically 
efficient systems create additional value that may be redis-
tributed among voters. Thus, if vignettes are economically 
more efficient, the economic losers may well be compen-
sated by economic gainers making the society overall bet-
ter off. As it may be noticed, at least these four issues need 
to be discussed:
1.  optimal infrastructure quantity,
2.  optimal infrastructure operational organisation,
3.  optimal and efficient pricing, and
4.  equity of welfare redistribution. 
The paper is organised into three additional chapters: 
the following chapter gives a short theoretical and lit-
erature review. The third chapter giving theoretical argu-
ments and fourth chapter giving organisational aspects of 
the issue. The fifth chapter concludes the discussion. 
The paper does not aim at giving a definitive conclusion 
to the topic but calls for further discussion and analysis.
2 Theory and literature review
The literature on the general problem of public goods 
and infrastructure is immense and if we don’t take into 
account Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations, it starts in 
principle with the German economist Schäffle [23] that ar-
gued that the state is more efficient than the market in the 
case of goods that serve many people at once. Wagner’s 
Foundations of Economic Policy puts forward the defining 
criteria of joint consumption (non-rivalry), and non-ex-
cludability [28]. He defines non-rival goods as being able 
to service additional consumers at low or zero marginal 
costs [28]. This work on the basic division of goods into 
private and collective consumption goods, shown in Table 
1, the distributional difficulties with the revenue-expend-
iture process in the public sector, as well as the nature of 
the pricing process itself, was explained by Musgrave [17, 
18]. 
Table 1 Classification of goods according to rivalry in consumption and 
excludability from consumption 
Excludability from consumption
Excludable Non excludable
Rivalry in 
consumption
Rival
Pure private 
goods
Common goods
Non rival Club goods
Pure public 
goods
Source: Mance et al. (2015), p. 127.
The basic idea of a collective consumption good was 
taken over and laid down in a mathematically rigorous 
way by Samuelson [22]. The consequences are shown 
graphically in Figure 1 as a movement from an inefficient 
state to an efficient state on the Pareto frontier.
Figure 1 Pareto optimality frontier with private and collective 
consumption goods
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In an economy consisting of two goods: the collective 
consumption good X and the private consumption good Y, 
the increased consumption of the collective consumption 
good X from x
1
 to x
2
 increases the social welfare from point 
A to point B. The basic idea consists of moving the actu-
al production and consumption to the Pareto frontier by 
maximising the use of available resources.
In his The Economics of welfare Pigou puts forth the 
idea that, ceteris paribus, higher outputs increase wel-
fare [20]. By increasing the consumption of the collective 
consumption good, both welfare and the national income 
increase as the collective consumption good (roads and 
highways) is both a final consumption good as well as a 
resource for the production of tradeable goods. This hy-
pothetic expansion of the production possibility frontier is 
shown on the right in Figure 2.
For the entire economic argument of zero opportuni-
ty cost of usage, we need to be bear in mind the fact that 
there is only an absence of the opportunity cost of usage, 
and not an a priori absence of opportunity costs of pro-
duction. As a matter of fact, and as shown in Table 2, the 
opportunity costs of production are positive, as before 
construction they amount to the value of the real option on 
total investment from the societal point of view. The value 
of the real option on the investment for a profit seeking 
investor might be different. When the option is exercised, 
the real option looses its value and the entire cost is irrev-
ocably sunk. Until the point of exercise, we may talk about 
the prospective sunk cost being a positive production cost 
that needs to be recovered. A thorough representation of 
types of goods and markets developed during more than 
50 years of discussion by Musgrave [17, 18], Samuelson 
[22], Buchanan [4, 5, 6, 7], and ultimately Ostrom [19] is 
given by Mance et al. [16].
A clear cut conclusion of the efficient pricing problem 
at marginal cost in industries exhibiting increasing re-
turns to scale and large fixed (“sunk”) costs, was given by 
Varian: “The appropriate guiding principle in these con-
texts should be that the marginal willingness to pay should 
be equal to marginal cost. This condition for efficiency can 
be approximated using differential pricing, and will in fact, 
be a natural outcome of profit-seeking behaviour.” [26] 
Needless to say, the primary function of government is not 
to make profits, but to provide for necessary public goods 
that would increase social welfare. 
Table 2 shows the relationship between opportunity 
costs of production and opportunity costs in consumption 
as determinants of the types of goods.
By increasing the consumption of the collective con-
sumption resource X, a country is able to increase its 
welfare firstly from point A to point B, and afterwards by 
using some of the collective consumption resource X to 
produce a tradeable good that would be traded for the pri-
vate good Y. In this way, an even higher indifference curve I
3
 might be reached. The theory is clear about the benefits 
of vignettes as a pricing mechanism of a non-scarce good 
from the moment it has been produced.
The problems with highways arise when congestion 
happens. Congestion is a consequence of road speed dif-
ferences due to lacking capacities of connected arterial 
roads, traffic accidents, etc. When a highway segment 
cannot be cleared by connecting roads, congestion fol-
lows. This is mostly the case during rush hours when the 
number of cars entering key road sections is much larg-
er than the connected roads are capable of clearing. “It 
should never be forgotten that the highway problem is es-
sentially one of peak load. There is little traffic congestion, 
even in Manhattan, at three in the morning.” [5] Now, the 
problem of peak traffic load in Croatia is not one between 
Figure 2 Extension of the Pareto optimality frontier with maximum 
usage of the collective consumption good and trade
Table 2 Opportunity costs of production and opportunity costs in consumption 
Opportunity costs of production
Positive prospective sunk costs =  
positive real option values
No prospective sunk costs =  
non positive real option values
Opportunity costs in 
consumption
Positive MC in consumption
Private and lumpy goods
MCx ≈ Px; Px > 0; PSC > 0
Common goods
MCx > Px; Px = 0; PSC = 0
No MC in consumption
Monopoly goods
MCx = 0; Px > 0; PSC > 0
Non economic goods
MCx = Px = PSC = 0
Source: Mance et al. (2015), p. 127.
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morning and evening rush hours, although these also hap-
pen in larger cities, but one between winter and summer 
seasons. During summer, Croatia’s population nearly dou-
bles, and there are some issues with congestion, although 
most of it happens at highway entrances and exits for the 
purpose of payment at the toll booths. Differential pricing 
is not a long term solution for the problem of congestion, 
although differential pricing is a good short-term econom-
ic allocation mechanism. There are no solutions in eco-
nomics: there are only trade-offs. The long term solution 
may only be of technical nature: an infrastructure capacity 
increase.
3 Cost structure and revenue management
The theory behind a vignette is quite straightforward. 
A road or a highway is a form of communication and trans-
portation infrastructure with extremely high fixed costs 
that are entirely “sunk” at the point of investment. Once 
a cost is “sunk”, from an opportunity cost perspective, it 
becomes irrelevant for business decision-making [2, 3]. 
Extremely high “sunk costs” are a primary reason why 
roads and highways are either governmentally financed, or 
part of a concession agreement between government and 
road operator as irreversible “sunk costs” pose a source of 
bankruptcy risk for the provider [16]. Concession agree-
ments are governmental warranties to the provider that 
risky “sunk costs” of the investment are not in any form 
to be expropriated by the government, and a further war-
ranty against undue competition, thus creating a gov-
ernmentally protected monopoly, although, this second 
aspect is important only to a lesser degree since large 
“sunk costs” of the investment are themselves a barrier to 
entry to competitors creating a natural monopoly. Let us 
remember that natural monopolies are created by specific 
cost structures that make it unprofitable for the potential 
competitors to enter the incumbent’s market if the mar-
ginal cost of operation is lower than the average variable 
cost, and when the total quantity demanded by the market 
is lower than the total capacity provided by the monopo-
list. Specific cost structures create specific incentives, and 
specific conduct by the incumbent firm, that results in 
a specific performance. Structure-conduct-performance 
analysis of natural monopolies is beyond the scope of this 
paper. The second important aspect of the road cost struc-
ture is the almost inexistent marginal cost of usage until 
the point of congestion. By inexistent opportunity cost of 
usage it is meant the cost of providing an additional con-
sumption unit of a good or service at zero cost. This point 
is a critical one in understanding the advantages of vi-
gnettes over other allocation and finance mechanisms.
3.1	 Efficient	pricing	theory
According to the efficient pricing theory an outcome 
is Pareto efficient if no consumer can be made better off 
without making some other consumer worse off. A neces-
sary condition for Pareto efficiency is that the marginal 
willingness to pay equals marginal cost. Marginal willing-
ness to pay means willingness to pay for an additional unit 
of the good. Marginal cost means the cost of an additional 
unit of the good. Since both marginal willingness to pay, 
and marginal cost amount to zero (or near zero), quantity 
dependent price needs to be zero to have a Pareto efficient 
outcome. [26]
Marginal cost and marginal price refer to additional 
consumption units and not to overall costs and overall 
prices paid for the service. This means that the last con-
sumption unit needs to have zero price. It doesn’t mean 
that the overall price across the demand curve should be 
zero. Thus, price discrimination of second degree, and 
possibly some sort of price discrimination of third degree 
would comply with this requirement. Any form of pric-
ing that is separate from the consumed quantity does not 
contradict the efficient marginal pricing rule. The problem 
to be solved may be represented as one of revenue man-
agement optimisation according to price discrimination 
policies and having regard to following constraints: full 
recuperation of infrastructure building costs, and maximi-
sation of domestic social utility of road usage without dis-
criminating other EU nationals. An additional ethical rule 
might be added: adherence to the “user pays” principle 
as much as applicable under the circumstances, although 
the norm has no backing in positive economics in case of 
non-scarcity. 
The optimal solution to the problem is probably a 
corner solution to the linear programming model with 
the goal function of social utility maximisation under 
constraints of cost recuperation and if applicable profit 
maximisation with the price mechanism designed not to 
discriminate by EU nationality. The solution is then either 
vignettes having an average price equal to the amount 
needed to recuperate costs divided by the total expected 
number of vehicles using the highway system during the 
observed period. All other vignettes would then be priced 
around this benchmark average. If price discrimination is 
to be effective, market segments need to be identifiable 
by their demand price elasticity, and the scheme needs to 
pass the EU Commission test for non-discrimination. 
There is nothing special about pricing of highway us-
age that wasn’t already seen in other markets such as 
telecommunications. There is a multitude of available 
packages from telecoms: time defined flat-rate packages, 
pay-per-minute, pay-per-second, pre-paid packages, loyal-
ty programmes, and every possible bundling combination 
thereof. Highway pricing will need to price discriminate to 
increase revenues and social welfare. 
Vignettes are a quantity based price discrimination 
mechanism as shown in Figure 3.
In case of regular congestion times, a highway with 
governmentally regulated prices of vignettes, may in ad-
dition develop a time-based, peak load, dynamic pricing 
based on opportunity costs of usage and an estimate of 
the price elasticity of demand. The more elastic the de-
mand, the more revenue is collected with more quantity 
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consumed. Clearly, a win win situation. An introduction 
of vignettes may not exclude other pricing mechanisms 
such as toll booths and electronic pricing systems. On the 
contrary, just like in telecommunications, there may exist 
a multitude of packages finely tuned to price discriminate 
and extract the maximum of revenue.
Cost structures based on large fixed and “sunk” costs 
induce pricing conduct based on price discrimination of 
second degree [8]. The marginal cost curve is so low that 
is practically inexistent, and with the average cost curve 
constantly falling to the point of capacity congestion SS, 
makes the highway a natural monopoly. 
3.2 The lighthouse in economics
Many economists used the lighthouse as an example of 
a pure public non excludable and non-rival good. In 1974, 
Ronald Coase challenged the view that lighthouses are 
public goods since private provision did occur in the past. 
But how were they financed if exclusion wasn’t possible? 
Mostly by bundling their service with the services of the 
nearby harbour. Enter revenue management and the most 
diverse pricing mechanisms.
On the issue of lighthouses Stiglitz wrote: “The costs of 
a lighthouse do not depend at all on the number of ships 
that sail past it.” [23] This is also the case of a highway 
operation. The costs of a highway does not depend on the 
number of cars driving on it.
Now, imagine a radio station or a mobile telephone op-
erator. The costs of radio station and telecommunication 
operation are also fixed and sunk and mostly independent 
of the number of users (less in the former, and more in the 
latter case), but dependent on the covered area. There is 
no queue in the ether. The opportunity costs of usage and 
the marginal costs of usage are both nil or close to zero. 
Nevertheless, the costs of the lighthouse, of the radio , of 
the telecommunication infrastructure or of a highway 
need to be recovered.
3.3 Revenue management
A necessary condition for Pareto efficiency is that the 
marginal willingness to pay must equal marginal cost [26]. 
The condition has several implications. Firstly, it must hold 
if the allocation is to be economically efficient. Secondly, 
the condition does not say anything about any particular 
unit of consumption except the last one that its price must 
equal its opportunity cost of usage which is zero. Thirdly, 
to be efficient if such pricing fails to recover total costs, the 
pricing scheme must be able to recover costs and needs 
to be independent of the incentive to use the road. One of 
such schemes is the vignette system.
Obviously, since the system of pricing is detached 
from the quantity consumed, it effectively constitutes a 
price discrimination in terms of the average price paid 
by the user per travelled distance. It is a price discrimi-
nation of second degree as it effectively gives unlim-
ited privilege of use within the time span of a vignette. 
Unlimited privilege does change consumer preferences 
and incentives. According to Vrtic et al., the annual vi-
gnette in Switzerland, for example, turned out to be un-
satisfactory with regard to demand management [27]. 
Concerning social acceptability aspects the social dilem-
ma of self-interest against social-interest is fundamen-
tal and in Switzerland the personal self-interest is three 
times stronger than the social interest concerning road 
financing mechanism designs. Most importantly, social 
support for alternative mechanism designs is mainly in-
fluenced by public problem perception and perceived ef-
fectiveness of a mechanism design. [27]
In most European countries, fuel taxes make up about 
half the retail price of fuel. In addition, each car driver who 
wants to use the highway system in 14 European countries 
needs to buy a one-year vignette. The revenues raised by 
the fuel tax and the vignettes are spent on the expansion 
and maintenance of the road infrastructure. However, a 
certain amount of revenues goes into the general federal 
budget. Under the principle of a unitary budget, no ex-
penditures are directly connected to any revenues, but all 
revenues contribute to all expenditures. This means, the 
vignette is a form of tax and not a charge for a service. [25, 
27]
4 Organisational aspects of highway operation
Four distinct operations or functions regarding in-
frastructure management and organisation need to be 
performed: provision with construction, operation with 
maintenance, finance, and consumption allocation. These 
four roles need not be performed by a single provider or 
management organisation. The finance role does not need 
to be the same as the allocation mechanism. The question 
of what roles shall be performed by what organisational 
unit is open to debate, and even the field of economic or-
ganisation has no definitive answers. For example, there is 
nothing in the positive economic science that implies that 
highways need to be priced. Or that highways should not 
be financed directly from income taxes.
Let us suppose that the construction function has 
been awarded to the best (lowest cost) bidder and fi-
nanced by the most affordable line of credit that can be 
Figure 3 Quantity based price discrimination (second degree)
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given to a sovereign debtor. The role of everyday man-
agement and organisation may be outsourced to an ex-
ternal service provider or performed by a governmental 
management organisation. Even if vignettes are chosen 
as the most appropriate method of finance, the ques-
tion of maintenance organisation remains open. There 
are two broad possibilities branching into several other 
smaller variants. 
Firstly, there is the possibility that the present conces-
sion contract holders remain in service and receive either 
a fixed or a variable compensation. The agreement is then 
valued as a swap between present cash flows and either 
fixed or variable cash flow alternatives that are going to be 
proposed to the concessionaire.
Secondly, there is a possibility of either a voluntary 
buy-out of concessionaires or their outright expropriation 
with subsequent costs of litigation, compensation, as well 
as other pecuniary costs such as loss of country reputation 
or worse.
Thirdly, the organisation of the maintenance may 
be conceded either as a whole (the entire network) for 
a certain duration, or parcelled into space-, duration-, 
and quality-dependent subsections on separate auc-
tions. There are three basic models that come to light: 
the British, the German and a fully private model. In the 
UK, the public highway segments are under maintenance 
agreements by different corporations. The remuneration 
is conditional on maintenance activities and traffic fre-
quency. But, these agreements were agreed upon under 
the circumstances of the veil of ignorance where traffic 
frequency was unknown to the government and the com-
peting concessionaires at the auction. In Germany, the 
entire public highway network is under public owner-
ship, and only the maintenance jobs are auctioned and 
given to the best bidder for every single case separately. 
Basically, the choice is between a centralised operational 
hierarchy, giving under concession (outsourcing) only 
the segments of the overall operation that cannot be 
performed by the governmental entity, and a network 
of smaller and independent concessionaires bidding 
for road segments that can be independently operated, 
with total operational freedom afterwards. It is a choice 
between hierarchies and networks at every operational 
level of organisation [15].
The German case offers less redundancy and idle-
ness of maintenance facilities and personnel, whereas 
the British system offers more readiness and security. 
If maintenance cots are negligible, a lot of security may 
be had for low additional cost under British-type mech-
anism-design. If the road network to be maintained is 
as vast and dense as in Germany, efficiency gains may 
be achieved by additional competition under German-
type mechanism design. The elastic supply and demand 
curves for road maintenance given in Germany by a vast 
road network and large number of contractors makes the 
German-type mechanism design optimal for Germany. 
The Germans treat the question of road financing (rev-
enue collection) separately from the question of invest-
ment. Revenue collection mechanism design is based on 
relative collection efficiencies, Ramsey taxes, and fiscal 
policy principles. The road construction is based entirely 
on social cost-benefit arguments. The road is to be con-
structed where and when the present value of the ac-
cruing social benefits is greater than the corresponding 
social costs.
The question of road pricing is an economic one and is 
only partially conditional on the level of privatization. If 
the opportunity cost of usage is nil, it is economically (al-
locatively) efficient to set the price of usage to zero. Even 
for a private operator. The private operator would then 
need to discover for himself the optimal pricing mecha-
nism design [1, 14]. The question of financing is then a 
separate question to be resolved according to the efficien-
cy of various public financing policies at disposal. There is 
nothing in this regard to stop the government from disre-
garding the user pays principle. The user pays principle is 
not an economic principle based on efficiency, but an ethi-
cal one. The “user pays” principle is primarily based on the 
notion that the underlying good or service is not a pure 
public good as commonly accepted in economics [12, 16, 
17, 18, 19, 22].
5 Conclusion
The question of highway pricing has been blurred by 
irrelevant arguments in the past. It is an economic issue. 
If the opportunity cost of usage is nil, it is efficient to set 
the quantity dependent price of usage to zero. The ques-
tion of finance is then a separate question of revenue 
management to be resolved according to the efficiency 
of various finance policies at disposal. Fixed charges, 
variable charges, and flat rate pricing systems are avail-
able. In case of congestions, dynamic pricing with peak 
load pricing stay at the disposal. The choice of one pric-
ing method does not necessarily exclude the others. The 
author prefers the vignette as it gives the widest possi-
ble set of non quantity dependent revenue management 
possibilities. Nevertheless, the transition to a system of 
vignettes poses a political welfare transfer challenge. By 
saying, there are no losers from the abolishment of the 
per use payment systems, it is not meant there is no one 
who shouldn’t adjust his economic behaviour. Distance-
dependent tolls are still the preferred pricing systems, 
in contrast to area licensing and time-dependent tolls. 
Nevertheless, the tide is turning and more and more 
countries are introducing vignettes. Unfortunately for 
Croatia, the economic discussion about optimal alloca-
tion mechanism design for highways turned political, and 
the elites lack the economic knowledge to provide such a 
design.
The purpose of this paper was to try to un-vignette the 
problem of vignettes: to try to un-blur the discussion from 
irrelevant arguments and bring the discussion back to the 
economics table. The author hopes it is just a start of a tru-
ly scientific discussion.
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